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Abstract
Participants in debates about developments in science and technology point to issues overlooked or
downplayed by scientists—or, if the debate is among scientists themselves, by other scientists.
Sometimes included among participants in debates are interpreters of science—sociologists, historians,
philosophers, and scholars from other fields of Science and Technology Studies. Taking these scholars
as the audience, this article asks what should we do if we identify a significant issue not yet subject to
debate? In particular, what should we do when the overlooked issue is conceptual—a matter of how
inquiry is framed—more than it is a matter of analyzing the evidence or applying the results? I address
the title question in-principle, but my thinking is informed by the range of ways I have been working to
influence research related to a specific case (summarized in an appendix). I do not argue for particular
actions or provide a how-to guide; my goal rather is to promote more systematic attention to the mostly
implicit models that scholars interpreting science have regarding their aspirations and strategies for
influencing science.
Keywords: Conceptual systematization

Participants in debates about developments in science and technology point to issues overlooked or
downplayed by scientists—or, if the debate is among scientists themselves, by other scientists. Antifluoridation campaigners noted the decline in cavities in communities with non-fluoridated water supplies
(Martin 1991); AIDS activists questioned the ethics of protocols for clinical trials and Cumbrian sheep
farmers pointed to possible sources of irradiation other than Chernobyl (Sismondo 2008); skeptics of
associations of human cancers with cell phone use invoke the inaccuracy of self-reported phone use
(Schmidt 2018); and so on. Sometimes included among participants in debates are interpreters of
science—sociologists, historians, philosophers, and scholars from other fields of Science and Technology
Studies (STS). Taking these scholars as the audience, this article asks what should we do if we identify a
significant issue not yet subject to debate? In particular, what should we do when the overlooked issue is
conceptual—a matter of how inquiry is framed—more than it is a matter of analyzing the evidence or
applying the results?
There is, of course, no reason to expect that an overlooked issue raised by an STS scholar would be
seen as a decisive contribution to science. After all, in establishing and contesting knowledge, scientists
mobilize heterogeneous resources: equipment, experimental protocols, citations, the support of
colleagues, the reputations of laboratories, metaphors, rhetorical devices, publicity, funding, and so on
(Latour 1987; Law 1987; Clarke and Fujimura 1992, 4-5). Understanding that does not warrant dispensing
with the what to do question. In this article, I address the title question in-principle, but my thinking is
informed by the range of ways I have been working to influence research related to a specific case (which
is summarized in the appendix). I do not argue for particular actions or provide a how-to guide; nor do I
tackle the larger subject of researchers overlooking the ways their research is shaped by social context.
Nevertheless, I hope that my consideration of what to do about overlooked conceptual issues stimulates
more systematic attention to the mostly implicit models that STS scholars have regarding their aspirations
and strategies for influencing science. This goal stands even if readers who consult the appendix deem
not significant the specific case of an overlooked conceptual issue that has concerned me.
1. The in-principle question
Readers who have already viewed the appendix know the field and the overlooked issue that
have informed my thinking. Please, however, put the specific case out of mind while I try to motivate the
general question in the title. The first step is to establish that there are times when our work states or
implies that conceptual issues have been overlooked by researchers. Let me start with the easy case in
which the title question’s “we” refers to contributors to philosophy of biology as the field has flourished in
the English-speaking world over the last 35 years.
A longstanding emphasis in philosophy of biology has been on systemization of biologists’
concepts. A well-known example of this line of work has been to systemize Darwin’s argument for natural
selection. The central logic laid out by Darwin (1859) in the first four chapters of On the Origin of Species
is, as I would present it using some modern language (Taylor 2001), given in Table 1.
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Table 1. A conceptual systemization of Darwin’s argument for natural selection*
1. IF there is
a. Variation among organisms in traits,
b. Inheritance (or reproducibility), at least partially, of traits [Chapters 1 and 2], and
c. Hyperfecundity, so that not all can survive to reproduce,
THEN there will differential representation of variant traits in lineages of organisms over time, in other
words, evolution (or "modification by descent"), and a struggle for existence [Chapter 3].
2. IF those that survive and reproduce are the ones most fit to their environment, i.e., survival (and
reproduction) of the fitter, or “natural selection,”
THEN evolution will result in local improvement of adaptation to conditions of existence [Chapter 4].
This is not the place to try to influence philosophers to accept my account over others (see Taylor
2001). The point, whether conceptual systemization is of Darwin’s argument or in some other realm of
biology, is that we are saying or implying that we make systematic and clear what researchers had not—
or more systematic and clearer. Or we extend their thinking further. In short, there are things that
researchers have overlooked and they are significant enough for us to spend our time examining them.
A second step in motivating the general question in the title is to establish that most of us do
something with our accounts of the issue. For a start, we use our systematizations to influence our
students, on the premise that an economical account aids their understanding and recalling of the ideas.
That modest action, in turn, has ramifications, which need not always be explicit. The systematization
distracts students’ attention from other aspects of the original, such as Darwin’s metaphors and his
extensive use of cases. After all, at 124 pages, the first four chapters have enormously more content than
Table 1. Conceptual systemization thus guides students towards downplaying Darwin the rhetorician in
favor of Darwin the theorist. If science is held to combine rational interpretation, empirical confirmation,
and influencing an audience, conceptual systemization steers our students away from science and
towards philosophy. That is, attention is not focused on the methodological and expository challenges of
assembling evidence to demonstrate that some evolutionary change and the adaptation of the resulting
traits to the environment were produced by a process of differential survival due to the effect of the trait.
Most of us also try to influence our philosophical colleagues to accept our systematization as
better than those of others, given, say, the logical flaws or what they omit from the original scientific work.
For example, Lewontin’s (1970) well-known systemization of Darwin’s argument adopts the modern
redefinition of the term fitness as the contribution of parents to numbers in the next generation. My
account in Table 1, however, preserves Darwin’s sense of fit-ness “to the conditions of life” (Darwin 1859,
60).
The two kinds of actions—influencing students and colleagues—may seem modest—even if in
the Darwin example we consider ramifications such as steering students’ attention to rational
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interpretation over empirical confirmation and influencing an audience. The actions suffice, however, to
make the point that most of us do do something with our accounts of overlooked issues. It follows
conceptually that we might examine the “what to do?” question more systematically. Let me propose a list
of options. (The order of options is not meant to convey priority.)
1. Stay quiet. We may have self-doubts given the numbers of researchers involved over any extended
period and science’s self-correcting mechanisms. We may also make a pragmatic decision that the
other options to follow are beyond our capacities.
2. Convey the ideas to students, perhaps, as mentioned above, because an economical account aids
their understanding and recalling of the ideas, but perhaps also because we hope, through the young,
to influence the next generation of research and debates.
3. Submit our ideas to the journals in which the researchers publish to see if we can get the ideas
recognized or have our errors exposed by reviewers. This approach is, of course, ambitious given
that we have not spent our careers assembling data in the field or lab, becoming fluent with the jargon
and expository style, establishing collegial relationships that allow us to solicit critical comments to
help fashion drafts that can get through positive reviews, and gaining the reputation that motivates
readers to read our work.
4. Build a collaboration with researchers to undertake the research that has been overlooked or elicit
their insights about why such research is not warranted.
5. Submit our analysis of the overlooked issue to audiences of philosophers of science, through
conversations, talks, and publications, to see if we can get our ideas recognized or have our errors
exposed by reviewers more interested in concepts than in method and empirical observation.
6. Tease out the historical, sociological, political, cultural implications of the issue that has been
overlooked and try to interest researchers from the relevant fields of interpretation of science in
exploring those implications.
7. Try to get wider public debate going by teasing out the political implications—if they exist—of the issue
that has been overlooked.
This list matches the range of ways I have been working to influence research related to a
specific case (summarized in the appendix). It seems unobjectionable to me, yet I understand that, for
others, not all these categories of action spring to mind. To wit: On two occasions I solicited answers to
the title question at the start of presentations to audiences of philosophers and historians of science. Of
the responses written on the notecards I collected back from the audiences, almost all fell in category 4
above, that is, recommending interaction with the researchers or doing the research oneself (Taylor
2011). I cannot show that these audiences were typical, but the experience matches my observation that
there are very few case studies or systematic treatment of this range of ways—from direct to backdoor or
indirect—to influence researchers about what they have overlooked. I return to this issue in the
discussion (Section 2).
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Suppose the “we” in the title question were expanded so as to include interpreters of science from
other STS fields. The seven kinds of actions would still apply, but, with respect to category 2, my
emphasis on concepts may seem less meaningful to students not in philosophy. At the same time, given
that conceptual issues often invite methodological changes, the overlooked conceptual issues could be
made relevant to a wider range of students (Chang 2013). Of course, interpreters of science also imply
(or even state explicitly) that researchers overlook the ways their research is shaped by social context. I
suspect that different kinds of actions would likely be called for to influence researchers to selfconsciously address their social situatedness (Taylor 2005, 135ff). Without discounting the importance of
such actions, examining them is beyond the scope of this article.
2. Discussion
The in-principle treatment in the section 1 conveys that, when interpreters of science assert or
imply that researchers have overlooked significant conceptual issues, there are a range of kinds of action
that might conceivably and feasibly be taken. The article is implying, as a “meta” point, that this issue—
the one in the title question—has been overlooked by researchers interpreting science. Let me qualify
that last claim in a number of ways.
First, as noted earlier, scientists mobilize heterogeneous resources; interpreters of science may
well be interested in studying and perhaps engaging around the ways research is shaped along
dimensions other than the overlooked conceptual issue. Still, as suggested by actions #6 and #7 in my
list, conceptual issues may provide points of entry to the social shaping of science.
Second, there are a few relevant case studies and systematic treatments that speak to
influencing researchers—scientists as well as interpreters of science—about what they have overlooked.
Stanford (2006) uses historical cases to draw the attention of philosophers of science to the possibility of
unconceived alternatives. Chang (2013) reviews a number of “functions” that would be served if historians
of science were to engage more with the content of scientific knowledge, being prepared to judge that
researchers have made misjudgements. Harman and Dietrich (2013), with an intended audience of
biologists as well as historians and philosophers of biology, assembles case studies of how 18 “outsider”
scientists had transformative influence on fields of the life sciences that were not their original homes.
The small size of this set of sources hardly diminishes my observation that there are very few case
studies or systematic treatment of this range of ways—from direct to backdoor or indirect—to influence
researchers about what they have overlooked.
Third, overlooked issues, by definition, do not constitute scientific or public controversies as
sociologist of science, Martin (2014, 21) defines them: debates that “occur over an extended period or
involve a lot of people.” Nevertheless, I see a parallel when Martin, writing to an audience of activists,
notes that STS studies provide few insights about strategy to participants in controversies (p. 449ff). This
conclusion affirms this article’s goal of promoting more systematic attention to the mostly implicit models
that scholars interpreting science have regarding their aspirations and strategies for influencing science.
Finally, Martin’s observation applies just as well to this article itself, given that I establish the title
question as an issue in principle but do not say what to do to influence interpreters of science to give
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more attention to the question, let alone provide guidance about what actions are most appropriate when
they think that researchers have overlooked a significant issue, conceptual or other. I wonder whether
addressing these issues requires influencing philosophers and other interpreters of science to selfconsciously address their own social situatedness or, at least, for them to get drawn into some
controversy about what to do. In the meantime, I hope this article suffices to make the point that
overlooked issues exist and warrant our examining the what to do question more systematically.
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Appendix. The specific case of a conceptual issue overlooked: Quantitative genetics and the possibility of underlying heterogeneity
The crux of the specific case is that throughout its 100-year history quantitative genetics seems to
have overlooked the implications of underlying heterogeneity—although relatives may be similar for a
given trait because they share more genes or environmental conditions than unrelated individuals, the
genes and environmental conditions underlying the development of the trait need not be the same from
one set of relatives to another. It is not the possibility of underlying heterogeneity by itself that makes it
seem significant to me, but its implications for the analysis and interpretation of classical and modern
quantitative genetics.
As laid out in Taylor (2014), claims that some human trait, say, IQ test score at age 18, shows
high heritability derive from an analysis of data from relatives. For example, the average similarity of pairs
of monozygotic (MZ) twins (who share all their genes) can be compared with the average similarity of
pairs of dizygotic (DZ) twins (who do not share all their genes). If the former similarity exceeds the latter, it
is reasonable to associate that with the greater genetic similarity of twins in a MZ pair (give or take
possibly greater similarity in upbringing of twins in a MZ pair raised together). The more MZ similarity
exceeds DZ similarity, the higher what quantitative genetics calls the heritability of the trait.
Researchers and commentators often describe heritability calculations as showing how much a
trait is heritable or genetic. However, no genes or measurable genetic factors (such as alleles, tandem
repeats, or chromosomal inversions) are examined in deriving heritability estimates, nor does the method
of analysis suggest where to look for them. Moreover, even if the similarity between twins or a set of close
relatives is associated with the similarity of yet-to-be-identified genetic factors, the factors may not be the
same from one set of relatives to the next, or from one environment to the next. In other words, the
underlying factors may be heterogeneous. It could be that pairs of alleles, say, AAbbcbDDee, subject to a
sequence of environmental factors, say, FghiJ, are associated, all other things being equal, with the same
outcomes as alleles aabbCCDDEE subject to a sequence of environmental factors FgHiJ (see Figure A.1
for the case of human twins where both members of each pair are raised in the same household).

7

Location L1 L2

L3

L4

L5

L6

L7

L8

Twin Pair
TP1

{

DZT

{ MZT AAbbccDDee // FghiJ

TP2

{MZT

TP3

{

TP4
TP5

sequence of
environmental
factors

DZT

{

DZT

{MZT aabbCCDDEE // FgHiJ

TP6

{

TP7
TP8

genetic factors
(pairs of alleles)

DZT

{MZT

Figure A.1. Factors underlying a trait may be heterogeneous even when identical (monozygotic) twins
raised together (MZT) are more similar than fraternal (dizygotic) twins raised together (DZT). The greater
similarity is indicated here by smaller size of the curly brackets. The underlying factors for two MZT pairs
are indicated by upper- and lowercase letters for pairs of alleles (A-E) and the environmental factors to
which they are subject (F-J).
The gap between homogeneous and heterogeneous genetic and environmental factors
influencing the development of a trait has not (yet) been recognized as a noteworthy concern by
quantitative geneticists or by critical commentators on heritability research (e.g., Downes 2015 and
references therein). To allow readers to appreciate why it concerns me, let me examine some
implications. These implications may make more sense, however, if I first clarify some terminological
issues that, in my experience, make it hard for people to visualize the difference between observable
genetic factors and calculations based on observations of traits, such as heritability calculations.
Heritability sounds like heritable; it should not be surprising that popular accounts elide the
distinction. (To cite a recent example: “a large study of twins has found links between genes and which
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university people go to”; Wilson 2018.) Researchers do not help either when they define heritability as the
"contribution of genetic differences to observed differences among individuals" (Plomin et al. 1997, 83; my
emphasis) or the "fraction of the variance of a phenotypic trait in a given population caused by (or
attributable to) genetic differences" (Layzer 1974, 1259). Admittedly, such definitions do not strictly rule
out the possibility that, from one set of twins to the next, different genes are linked to similar, say,
university admission outcomes, but they do not draw attention to that idea.
To appreciate that “genetic” in the technical definition of heritability does not refer to genetic in the
sense of stretches of the DNA in the genome, consider the partitioning of variation of a trait into fractions
that is the foundation of classical quantitative genetics. This is a field that arose in agriculture, where
multiple varieties of plants can be grown in repeated plots in many locations (Figure A.2). For a given
trait, say, yield per unit area, the variation can be partitioned (through the statistical technique of Analysis
of Variance [ANOVA] and its kin) into four components: a. between the means for each variety when
averaged across locations (VA, VB, etc.); b. between the means for each location when averaged across
varieties (L1, L2, etc.); c. between the means for each variety-location combination when averaged across
plots (and after taking out a. and b.; not depicted); d. what is left over or residual. (Components c and d
are combined in the curly brackets of Figure A.2.)
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Figure A.2. Partitioning of variation in the ideal agricultural evaluation trial where each of a set of varieties
is raised in each of set of locations, and there are two or more replicates in each variety-location
combination. The variation among replicates within variety-location combinations is indicated by the size
of the curly brackets. (The agricultural evaluation trial contrasts with Figure A.1 in which the replicates of
any variety—twin pairs—are raised in only one location—household—per variety.)
Heritability, technically, is the ratio of the variation among variety means to the total variation for
the trait (a ratio that is contingent on the specific set of varieties and locations). There is no conceptual or
empirical connection between such a measure of variation in a trait and differences among individuals in
their genes. The distinction becomes obscured, however, when the following moves are made: varieties
are referred to as genotypes; the variation among the variety or genotypic means across locations is
called genotypic variance; this term is shortened to genetic variance; and that quantity is interpreted,
ambiguously, as the fraction of variation in a trait associated with "genetic differences” (Taylor 2014). The
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origin of these common moves can be traced to the models used by quantitative genetics to partition trait
variation. In order to take different degrees of relatedness into account (e.g., MZ twins being more closely
related than DZ twins), these models posit theoretical, idealized genes that have simple Mendelian
inheritance and direct contributions to the trait. Yet, given that the partitioning is of variation in traits, it
must be possible to partition variation without using models of unobservable genes and their hypothetical
effects (Taylor 2012; Note that, although theory and simulation for gene-free analysis show that human
heritability estimates are unreliable and typically overestimate the correct figures, this is a separate
overlooked issue from the one raised in this appendix.) If such gene-free analysis were standard
practice—it is not—it would be easier to keep sight of the distinctions that are summarized in Table A.1.
Table A.1. Three conceptually and empirically distinct senses of the term “genetic”
“Genetic”

Area

Focus

What varies among subjects

Sense 1

Quantitative genetics

trait

components of variance of trait, partitioned
using ANOVA

Sense 2
Sense 3

Relatedness

variable part of

fraction of variable part of genome shared

genome

by relatives

Population and

site(s) on

heterozygosity at site(s)

Molecular genetics

chromosomes

The distinction between observable genes and calculations based on observations of traits, such
as estimation of heritability, might break down if there were a gradient of measurable, albeit yet-to-beidentified factors running through the variety/genotype/twin-pair means in Figures A.1 and A.2. The
existence of such a gradient, however, need not be the case, as is obvious when we think about, say,
human height. That development of height occurs through pathways that involve diverse combinations of
genetic and environmental factors—not a single gradient—makes intuitive sense when we note the
different timing of growth (e.g., early spurt, late bloomer) and the make-up of the final height (e.g., long
trunk, short legs versus short trunk, long legs).
If we keep firmly in mind the distinction between observable genes and calculations based on
observations of traits, it is possible to delineate the approaches researchers can take on the basis of
heritability estimates when the underlying factors are unknown and possibly heterogeneous. As noted in
Taylor (2014), researchers might:
1. seek to identify the specific genetic and environmental factors without reference to the trait’s
heritability or the other fractions of the total variance in the given trait;
2. take high heritability as a heuristic indicator that the trait is potentially worthwhile candidate for
molecular research but expect many fruitless molecular investigations. Such investigations may bear
fruit for that (unknown) fraction of high-heritability traits for which the underlying factors are not
heterogeneous;
3. restrict attention to variation within a set of relatives. This path makes sense because, even if the
underlying factors are not known, high heritability still means that if one twin develops a trait (e.g.,
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type 1 diabetes) the other twin is more likely to as well. The second twin might be advised to take
measures to reduce the health impact if and when the disease started to appear for that twin.
However, notice that this path assumes that the timing of getting the condition differs from the first
twin to the second; the factors influencing the timing could well be heterogeneous;
4. focus on heritability as a fraction of the variation and put aside any search for associated genes or
environmental factors. This focus is useful in agricultural and laboratory breeding as a heuristic to
predict advance under selective breeding. Ditto for evolutionary biology to the extent that it borrows
the models and practices of artificial selection. (If the actual advance is less than predicted, one
source of the discrepancy might be the underlying heterogeneity of genetic factors and their reassortment through mating. Yet the discrepancy matters little because breeders can always
compensate: they discard the undesired offspring, breed the desired ones, and continue. Of course,
selective breeding is not an acceptable option for humans); and
5. restrict the range of varieties or locations (and thereby reduce any underlying heterogeneity).
Agricultural researchers can do this in a number of ways: restrict the range of locations in which a
variety is raised or grown; control environmental conditions, such as (for animals) the regimes of
feeding and husbandry or (for plants) the application of fertilizer and irrigated water; or produce inbred
lines and thereby eliminate the heterogeneity of genetic factors that characterize outbred varieties. In
the study of human traits, it is not feasible to control the full range of relevant environmental
conditions or to breed for genetic uniformity, but there are some ways to restrict the locations
included, e.g., to include only families of low socioeconomic status (Turkheimer et al. 2003).
The set of five approaches above is quite circumscribed; this makes the implications of
overlooked possibility of underlying heterogeneity significant, at least in my assessment. It diminishes the
utility for medical research and potential treatment not only of the results of classical quantitative genetics
but also of Genome-Wide Association studies (McCarthy et al. 2008). And it puts an exclamation point on
the scientific consensus that most medically significant traits are associated with many genes of quite
small effect. The possibility pushes back against the enthusiasm of researchers who accept "the
estimation of genetic variance in populations [and want to move] to the detection and identification of
variants that are associated with or directly cause variation” (Visscher et al. 2007).
Concrete examples under the seven categories of actions in section 1
Section 1 in the body of the article motivated the title question in principle: interpretation of
science involves claims that researchers overlook significant issues and there are a range of kinds of
action that we might take. Regarding the specific case of an overlooked conceptual issue described
above, let me now list actions I took between 2004-14 (extending at times into broader concerns about
nature-nurture debates) (Table A.2). This list should indicate that actions under each category proposed
in section 1 are not simply conceivable in principle, but feasible. Making this point does not depend on my
recounting the details of each action or soliciting readers’ assessments of my successes and failures.
(Notes at the bottom of the table, however, provide relevant URLs for anyone wanting to follow up.)
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Table A.2. Some actions I took between 2004-14 regarding the specific case described above
1. Stay quiet

Notwithstanding the actions summarized in the categories below, I did not
center my research, presentations, and profile as a scholar on underlying
heterogeneity. I made a pragmatic decision to keep the focus of my research
on social epidemiological approaches that address the life course development
of health and behavior (Taylor 2004, 2018).

2. Convey the ideas to

Not much action: One session only in a semester-long doctoral course on

students

Epidemiological thinking (Taylor 2018).1

3. Submit ideas to

The article published as Taylor (2012) was the end result of a sequence of

science journals

submissions to science journals of progressively less status. Along the way,
implications were stripped out or toned down to get around reviewers who,
without identifying errors, resisted the effort to revisit what they considered had
already been critiqued or shown not to be a problem or was no longer of
interest. (The experience matched that described in Myers 1986.)
A major university press recommended publication in some alternative forum to
get the ideas vetted by more scientists before the Press would send a book
manuscript out for review. This advice led to the independent publishing of
Taylor (2014) (which addressed more issues than underlying heterogeneity).

4. Build a collaboration

An NSF SGER (Small Grants for Exploratory Research) budgeted for visits with

with researchers

researchers. Some researchers were not open to visits; others were, but the
visits were shorter than needed to builds collaborations.

5. Submit ideas to

Most of my efforts fit under this category, resulting in 9 articles and 5

philosophy of science

commentaries.2

journals
6. Tease out the

Session at joint meetings of STS societies, Vancouver 2006.3

historical, sociological,

Visiting fellowship at KLI near Vienna 2008 & 2010.

political, cultural

New England Workshops on Science and Social Change, at Woods Hole 2009

implications

and Coimbra Portugal in 2012.4
Planned blog of manuscripts and reviews (modeled on Myers 1986) [not
undertaken].
“Why look at genes” series of blog posts, 20145

7. Tease out the

Joined and participated in Genes and Society Working Group.6

political implications

Long interview with reporter planning a review for Science of developments in
nature-nurture science [no article emerged].
Proposal for new book, Troubled by Heterogeneity, on heterogeneity more
generally than with regard to heritability.7
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Notes: 1. http://www.faculty.umb.edu/pjt/epi; 2. http://www.faculty.umb.edu/pjt/cv.pdf; 3.
http://www.faculty.umb.edu/pjt/4S06.html; 4. http://www.stv.umb.edu/newssc09.html &
http://www.stv.umb.edu/Coimbra12.html; 5. https://whystolookforgenes.wordpress.com; 6.
http://www.genesandsociety.org/; 7. https://scholarworks.umb.edu/cct_sicw/7
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